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No. 20070855 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUSAN OLSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee, 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant Susan Olsen submits this brief in support of her appeal 
from an order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendant/Appellee. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(j), conferring jurisdiction on this Court over cases transferred to this 
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Court from the Supreme Court, which had original appellate jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. §78 A-3-102(j) over orders of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(j) and Utah rules of Appellate Procedure rule 42(a), this case was 
transferred and assigned to the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order of 
May 12, 2009, granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, given that 
there were genuine issues of material fact 1: whether Defendant/Appellee's offer of 
a course for an agreed upon tuition fee and directed study fee was a binding 
contractual agreement preventing Defendant/Appellee from later requiring payment 
of an undisclosed additional flat fee for unspecified electronic resource materials; 2: 
whether the imposition of the undisclosed flat fee for unspecified electronic 
resource materials was an unfair and deceptive act or practice; 3: whether that the 
imposition of a late fee resulting from Defendant/Appellee's decision to reallocate 
payment from one course to another was an unfair and deceptive act or practice; 4-
whether that practice of re-allocating payments from one balance to a disputed 
balance was an unfair and deceptive act or practice; 5- whether Defendant/ 
Appellee's failure to properly investigate and correct reports it made to Equifax and 
Experian were a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; 5- whether the actions 
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taken in collecting claimed amounts owed constituted tortuous conduct for which 
relief may be granted. 
A. Standard of review 
The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, which 
the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn, 
84 P.3d 1134,1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is 
decided by the court as a matter of law. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110 
P.3d 168, 172 (Utah App. 2005). 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has been a showing "that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." J.R Simplot Company v. Sales King International Inc. 
17 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the 
district court's decision to grant summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the 
district court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the 
facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party." Id. 
B. Preservation of issue 
Plaintiff/Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal following the District 
Court's granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is a consumer rights case arising out of Plaintiff/Appellant's 
transactions for educational services with Defendant/Appellee, a private educational 
corporation. The Complaint contains causes of action for breach of contract, 
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, violation of the federal Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, and various tort claims. (District Court File, pgs. 1-16) 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On March 31, 2006, Plaintiff/Appellant filed her Complaint against 
Defendant/Appellee University of Phoenix, Inc. for damages that she claimed were 
caused by violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§13-11-1 et.seq., for violations ofthe Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15U.S.C.A. §1681, 
et. seq., for breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, and intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. (District Court File, pgs. 1-16) 
On May 8,2006, Defendant/Appellee filed its Answer and jury demand. (District 
Court File, pgs. 17-25) 
On April 30, 2008, Defendant/Appellee filed: a Motion to Dismiss or for 
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Summary Judgment; Memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary 
Judgment; Affidavit of Briccannie Iverson in support of Motion to Dismiss or for 
Summary Judgment; and Affidavit of David O. Williams in support of Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred to individually or as Motion 
for Summary Judgment). (District Court File, pgs. 6-179) 
On June 26, 2008, Defendant/Appellant filed her Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Susan Olsen in Support of Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Chad Steur in Support of Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (District Court File, pgs. 180-319) 
On September 19, 2008, Defendant/Appellee filed its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and Supplemental 
Affidavit of Bricannie Iverson in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary 
Judgment. (District Court File, pgs. 323-417) 
On November 5, 2008, the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment took 
place in the Third Judicial District Court-West Jordan. The trial court granted 
Defendant/Appellee's motion in its entirety and order Plaintiff/Appellant to submit a 
Findings of Fact and Order. (District Court File, pgs. 422-429) 
On May 12, 2009, the trial court signed and entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law & Order. (District Court File, pgs. 430-432). 
On June 11, 2009, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. (District Court File, 
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pgs. 433-434). 
SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant established the following relevant background facts: 
Plaintiff was a student at the University of Phoenix in 2004, taking classes for an 
elementary teaching certificate. (District Court File, pgs 91-179, see Exhibit A 
Olsen Dep. at pg. 10 ). On February 3, 2004, Plaintiff signed Defendant's Student 
Financial Agreement authorizing her course tuition to be automatically billed to 
Plaintiff/Appellant's credit card. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit 
A-University of Phoenix Online Student Financial Agreement.) On May 25, 2004, 
Defendant registered Plaintiff for two online courses, SPE 532 and MED 509. 
Defendant acknowledged it would process payment via her credit card. (District 
Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit A-May 25, 2004 and May 27, 2004 emails.) 
On May 27, 2004, Defendant acknowledged Plaintiffs successful registration for 
the course. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit A-May 25, 2004 
orientation information email.) 
Concerning the breach of contract claim and the various tort claims, Plaintiff 
established the following facts: On May 20, 2004, Plaintiff asked her academic 
advisor, via email, the costs of two courses she was considering, MAT/534 and 
MAT/536. On May 24, 2004, via email, her academic advisor quoted the price for 
MAT/534 of $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee. On May 25, 2004, 
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Plaintiff, via email, agreed to take MAT/534. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see 
Exhibit C emails.) On June 30, 2004, Plaintiff received confirmation of successful 
registration for MAT/534 (later changed to MAT/536). The only fee noted was the 
$250 directed study fee. The method of payment was again acknowledged as being 
the same as for tuition, e.g. the Student Financial Agreement. (District Court File, 
pgs 184-245, see Exhibit A-June 30, 2004 directed study confirmation email.) 
On August 9, 2004, Defendant sent an invoice to Plaintiff reflecting a $750 
balance (the price of tuition and directed study free for MAT 536.) This invoice did 
not reflect a charge for any other fee. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit 
G-August 9, 2004 invoice.) 
Plaintiff further established that Plaintiff, via email, alerted Defendant that the 
invoice was incorrect due to the agreement she had with the academic counselor. 
(District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit F-August 13, 2004 and August 16, 
2004 one-page email exchange.) 
On August 31,2004, Defendant admitted the error and agreed to the price quoted. 
However, Defendant advised that it was assessing a previously undisclosed 
electronic material fee (e-resource fee). Defendant apologized for failing to disclose 
said fee. Defendant also told Plaintiff she had a past-due balance for SPE 532 and 
MED 509. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit D-August 31, 2004 email.) 
Concerning the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act claim and the various tort 
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claims, and specifically regarding the electronic material fee, Plaintiff established 
that Defendant did not disclose this fee prior to her acceptance of the course offering 
and that Defendant concealed the existence of this fee by not revealing the fee in any 
materials pertaining to this course or the cancelled course. (District Court File, pgs 
184-254, see Olsen Affidavit paragraphs 3 and 4.) Defendant's only reference to 
the existence of this type of fee is contained in a catalogue page that states the fee is 
due prior to the first session of class if it is applicable. (District Court File, pgs 
180-183.) No documentation published or provided by Defendant states that the fee 
is applicable to either MAT/534 or MAT/536. Defendant's own academic advisors 
could be unaware of the existence of this fee (District Court File, pgs 255-316, see 
Opposition page 5, Dispute as to Fact Number 10, and referenced exhibits.) 
Defendant demanded payment of the e-resource fee at least eight [8] times and 
made numerous threats to send her account to collections. (District Court File, pgs 
184-245, see Exhibits F, G and H.) 
Plaintiff established that her account was sent to campus collections andon 
September 17, 2004, she was administratively withdrawn from classes. (District 
Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibits L.) 
When Defendant finally offered to waive its unfair fees, it was conditional and 
only after the account had already been sent to collections. Plaintiff established that 
via letter dated October 19,2004, Defendant offered to waive the electronic material 
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fee and late fee if Plaintiff would pay the claimed past-due balance (District Court 
File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibits E.) Plaintiff received a letter, with the same October 
19, 2004 date, from an independent debt collection agency. (District Court File, pgs 
184-245, see Exhibits I, Johnson & Roundtree letter.) 
Concerning the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act claim and various tort claims, 
and specifically regarding the late fee and claimed past-due balance, Plaintiff 
established that she had filled out and submitted prior to registering for those courses 
an authorization to charge her credit card; that Defendant's policy prohibited the 
completion of course registration unless full payment was received; and that 
Plaintiff/Appellant received notice of successful registration for SPE 532 and MED 
509. 
Defendant's accounting records show payments were received on June 2, 2004 
and June 10, 2004, and credited to SPE 532 and MED 509 (District Court File, pgs 
184-245, see Exhibits B, Customer Account History.) Payment for SPE 532 and 
MED 509 was credited as received almost one month before Plaintiff received, on 
June 30, 2004, confirmation that she had successfully registered for MAT/534 
(changed to MAT/536). 
Plaintiff was sent the first invoice for MAT/536 on August 9, 2004. Defendant's 
policy provided for the imposition of a late fee "when tuition is not paid prior to the 
first class session of the course. " (District Court File, pgs 180-183). Defendant's 
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Finance Director could not determine, looking at Defendant's student statements, 
the basis for the late payment, and that the imposition of a late fee depended on how 
Defendant applied funds to existing balances (District Court File, pgs 255-319, see 
Deposition of Bricannie Iverson, pages 67-68.) 
Concerning the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and the tort claims, Plaintiff 
established Defendant referred her account to Johnson & Roundtree collection 
agency and to ACT collection agency; that Plaintiff disputed the debt with both 
agencies; that Defendant reported the account as delinquent to Equifax and Experian; 
that Plaintiff disputed the debt with Equifax and Experian; that Defendant verified 
the debt with Equifax and Experian; and that Plaintiff was denied a loan from 
Capital One based upon the Equifax report of the delinquent account. (District Court 
File, pgs 184-254, see Exhibit I.) 
Concerning damages on all claims, Plaintiff established that she suffered lost 
time in dealing with the dispute, including lost time from work; that she suffered 
mental and emotional stress including lost sleep, worry, depression, back pain, and a 
20 pound weight gain. (District Court File, pgs 184-254, see Olsen Affidavit 
paragraph 9.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's email offering MAT/534 for a specified tuition fee and 
specified directed study fee was a valid offer and that Plaintiffs acceptance of that 
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offer is a binding contractual agreement that Defendant breached by attempting to 
add an additional fee to the amount owed and then administratively withdrawing 
Plaintiff from the class for her refusal to pay. 
The imposition of electronic material fee, undisclosed as related to the specific 
course offerings and only mentioned in the general catalog price list as being 
charged "when applicable" is a hidden fee and constitutes an unfair and deceptive 
act or practice. 
The imposition of a late fee, shown in Customer Account History as being 
imposed on September 4, 2004 but not appearing in the September 9, 2004 invoice 
or any other communication until October 13, 2004, after Defendant re-allocated 
payment from SPE 532 and MED 509 to MAT/534, is a manipulation of 
Defendant's late-fee policy and constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice. 
The practice of re-allocating payments from one balance to a disputed balance is 
an unfair and deceptive act or practice. 
The reporting of Plaintiff s account as delinquent to Equifax and Experian based 
on unfair and deceptive practices, and the failure to properly investigate and correct 
reports following Plaintiffs disputes to those credit reporting agencies, is a violation 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
The actions taken as described above, and the repeated demand for payment, the 
threats and actual referral to debt collection agencies, the reporting of Plaintiff s 
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account as delinquent and unilaterally withdrawing Plaintiff from classes, 
constitutes tortuous conduct for which relief should be granted. 
Argument 
1. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated 
May 12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the Breach of Contract claim. 
The District Court's Order dated May 12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment, 
found that the parties did not agree as to the payment of the electronic material fee 
(E-resource fee) and thus it was properly charged. The basis for this determination 
was Defendant's argument that no contract existed excluding the term because there 
was no "meeting of the minds." 
Under Utah law, contract analysis begins by looking at the four corners of the 
contract for ambiguities. See Gillmor v. Macey,121 P.3d 57, 70 (Utah App. 2005). 
The contract consists of the email offer and acceptance. On May 24,2004, via email, 
Plaintiffs academic advisor offered MAT/534 for $294/credit hour plus a $250 
directed study fee. On May 25, 2004, Plaintiff, via email, accepted the offer by 
agreeing to take MAT/534. On June 30, 2004, Plaintiff received confirmation of 
successful registration. There was no mention of an e-resource fee in any of these 
communications.(District Court File, pgs 184-254, see Exhibits D and A.) 
A reading of the four corners of the contract show it was unambiguous. It refers 
with specificity to the significant, material terms of course designation, tuition rate 
per credit hour, and a directed study fee. It also provides the terms of payment by 
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reference. There is no other indication that additional fees or charges may apply. 
Although the contract on its face is unambiguous, under Utah law, the court 
may still consider any relevant evidence to determine whether a latent ambiguity 
exists. To that end, the court may "consider any credible evidence offered to show 
the parties' intention/' Gillmorv. MaceyJ21 P.3d 57, 70 (Utah App. 2005). 
The intent of the parties was to enter into a contract for educational services, 
which is implied by the nature of the transaction. 
To find a latent ambiguity, the court looked to the parties' relationship and the 
general expectations given that relationship. In support, the Defendant set forth, and 
the court found, that college courses generally require books or other materials. 
Therefore, the court determined that Defendant's intent was that books and materials 
would be covered elsewhere, which was different that Plaintiffs intent. The result 
was an ambiguity and no meeting of the minds as to this term. The court concluded 
that Defendant thus had a right to collect the fee. 
The court erred in finding an ambiguity based on general relationship 
expectations. First, it is clear that Defendant took no direct action that would give 
Plaintiff the expectation that MAT/534 (or MAT/536) would require books and 
materials. MAT/534 started on July 11, 2004. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs first 
actual notice of the e-resource fee was August 31, 2004. Defendant could produce 
no document that showed Plaintiff either knew or had access to information linking 
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the fee to the course before that time. (District Court File, pgs 184-254, Olsen 
Affidavit paragraph 3.) 
Further, Plaintiff was not provided constructive notice. Although Defendant's 
Tuition and Fees rate sheet reference the fee with the caveat "if applicable", the rate 
sheet does not state when the fee applies or how the fee is different from the Book 
and Material Charges also listed on the rate sheet. There is no guidance or criteria 
for when the fee applies. 
Utah law provides that vague or conditional terms are nebulous and 
unenforceable. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, paragraph 
18, (2004). The notice in the rate sheet is both vague and conditional. It is the 
equivalent of no notice. 
Since Defendant took no action to put students on actual or constructive 
notice that the cost of MAT/534 was $60 greater than advertised, Defendant argued 
that Plaintiff should have expected the fee would be covered elsewhere because 
books and materials were handled in that manner. 
The important distinction is that books and materials are never a set fee. 
Defendant's Tuition and Fees schedule acknowledges this in stating that "Book and 
Material Charges" vary by course. The e-resource fee, if applicable, is always $60. 
Plus, the e-resource fee is not the Book and Material Charges. It is a separate fee in 
addition to Book and Material Charges. 
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Thus, the Court incorrectly found an ambiguity based on the analogy to a book 
and material charge. It may well be that book and material charges would be handled 
outside of the contract. However, there was no evidence that the parties intended for 
this special fee to be excluded from the quote for the course. 
However, if the Court of Appeal finds that an ambiguity did exist, then the 
Court of Appeal review is "strictly limited" to determine if the trial court's findings 
of fact are "sufficiently supported by the evidence and not clearly 
erroneous..."(internal citations omitted). Id. 
The trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. The evidence that 
Plaintiff should have anticipated an e-resource fee separate from the tuition and 
directed study fee was twofold: Plaintiffs deposition testimony and the Affidavit of 
Defendant's Director of Finance. 
Plaintiff testified that she didn't recall whether or not all of her courses 
required a textbook, or the costs of those textbooks. 
The Director of Finance provided an Affidavit that set forth the general 
proposition that most courses require textbooks or other required reading material. It 
goes on to state that, "[occasionally, the text or required reading will be made 
available online, for which the University charges an electronic resources fee, or 
"e-resource" fee, of $60.00, in lieu of the student having to purchase a separate 
hard-copy textbook." 
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This evidence supports the general proposition that books and materials are 
required for most courses. It may even support the general proposition that books 
and materials transactions are intended to be covered separately from tuition and fee 
transactions. However, the finding of fact linking the e-resource fee to transactions 
involving books and materials is clearly erroneous. 
There are clear distinctions between required textbooks or reading materials 
and the e-resource fee. Textbooks or reading materials are generally required. The 
e-resource fee was only "occasionally" required, and only required for attendees of 
the Utah campus. 
Textbooks or reading materials do not equate to a set cost. The price varies by 
textbook type and author. The cost to the student varies depending on the choice to 
purchase new or used textbooks. The e-resource fee, on the other hand, was a flait fee, 
regardless type, author, or date of authorship. 
Textbooks or reading materials costs may be avoided. Students may choose not 
to purchase a textbook but instead use the textbook at the library, or borrow one from 
a friend. The e-resource fee was a required fee. 
Textbooks or reading materials transactions did not require purchases from 
Defendant. There are numerous book sellers a student may choose from. The 
e-resource fee transaction required payment to Defendant. 
The Findings of Fact were clearly erroneous based on the evidence. It should 
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also be noted that no adequate foundation that the Director of Finance had personal 
knowledge concerning e-resource fee. In the Affidavit, she states that each student 
has an online account which contains a link to a webpage showing and explaining 
the e-resource fee. In deposition, when this subject came up, she admitted she didn't 
know if this statement applied to Plaintiff. Her pre-deposition review of this case did 
not give her any reason to believe that Plaintiff would have known of the existence 
of the e-resource charge prior to August 31, 2004. 
2. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated May 
12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the claim for violations of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et. seq. 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) prohibits deceptive acts or 
practices by suppliers in a consumer transaction. The Act defines "Supplier" as a 
seller or other person who regularly solicits consumer transactions. See Utah Code 
Ann. §13-11-3(6). A "Consumer transaction" includes the sale of goods, services, 
or other property, both tangible and intangible, to a person for primarily personal, 
family, or household purposes " See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-3(2). 
The central purpose of the Sales Practices Act is "to protect consumers from 
suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.'1 Utah Code 
Ann. § 13-11-2(2). 
The UCSPA broadly defines a deceptive act or practice. Per se violations of the 
act include the following: 1-Making a representation that a specific price advantage 
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exits, if it does not. Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2(2); 2- Indicating that a consumer 
transaction involves or does not involve .. .obligations, if the representation is false. 
Utah Code Ann. §13-1 l-4(j)(i); and 3-Charging a consumer for a consumer 
transaction that has not previously been agreed to by the consumer; Utah Code Ann. 
§13-ll-4(r). 
A. The imposition of the e-resource fee is a deceptive act or practice. 
As shown above, Plaintiff established that she did not receive actual or 
constructive notice that enrolling in MAT/534 (later MAT/536) would obligate her 
to pay Defendant a $60 e-Resource fee. Thus, the May 24, 2004, email offering 
MAT/534 for $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee is a written 
representation concerning a price advantage which did not exist, which was false, 
and which Plaintiff did not agree to pay. These are per se violations of the UCSPA. 
The term "rEsource® Course Materials Charge" is a fa?ade. It is a term that is 
used to disguise an additional administratively imposed fee that in this case is in 
addition to the disclosed Directed Study fee. 
The fact it is a fa?ade is established by the lack of relationship between the fee 
and the actual material costs. The fee is always $60, while the Tuition and Fee rate 
sheet establishes that Books and Material Charges vary. 
Further, the fee is a charged by the Utah campus only. It is a campus-specific fee, 
not a material specific fee. On August 31, 2004, Defendant's Financial Services 
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Representative explained the fee to Plaintiff stating that, "E resource is something 
that the Utah campus uses for class materials, and readings. Although you owe the 
Online campus, you are coded under our campus, so we have to collect from you." 
The evidence establishes that the e-Resource fee is a way for the Utah campus to 
generate additional fixed revenue regardless of the nature and extent of e-resources 
provided. For non-Utah campus students, the actual costs of the e-resourses are 
absorbed in the tuition or other fees charged. Online students through the online 
University are not charged this fee. 
The UCSPA provides that the Director of the Division of Consumer 
Protection shall promulgate substantive rules concerning the Act. These "shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote their purpose and policies. Rl 52-11-1. 
The substantive rules promulgated pursuant to this authority provide for 
additional definitions and per se violations. An advertisement is defined as any 
written communication made to a consumer which identifies or represents the terms 
of any item of service. R152-11-1B(1). An offer means any attempt to effect an offer 
to enter into a consumer transaction. Rl 52-11 -1 B(6). 
These rules state that it is a deceptive act to make any offer in written advertising 
without stating clearly and conspicuously any conditions. R152-11-2A. The list of 
per se violations include failing to disclose additional charges. R152-11-2A(1). 
In addition to the other noted violations which also apply here, the imposition of 
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an e-resource fee by the Utah campus only was not disclosed. 
The UCSPA also prohibits unconscionable acts. Utah Code Ann. §13-11-5. An 
unconscionable act or practice can be either procedural or substantive. "Procedural 
unconscionability was recharacterized in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 
121 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), as "absence of 
meaningful choice." The court elaborated: Unconscionability has generally been 
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be 
determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction." 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock, Co., 106 P2d 1028. 
Plaintiff clearly did not have a meaningful choice because the e-resource fee was 
mandatory. 
B. The imposition of the late fee is a deceptive act or practice. 
On May 25,2004, Defendant registered Plaintiff for two online courses, SPE 532 
and MED 509. Defendant acknowledged it would process payment via her credit 
card. On May 27,2004, Defendant acknowledged Plaintiffs successful registration 
for the course. Defendant's accounting records show payments were received and 
credited to these two courses on June 2, 2004 and June 10, 2004. 
Defendant's policy provided for the imposition of a late fee "when tuition is not 
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paid prior to the first class session of the course." 
Initially, Defendant claimed the tuition was due for MAT/534. The invoice dated 
August 9, 2004 stated the amount due was for MAT/534. However, no late fee was 
imposed. 
At some point in time, Defendant re-allocated payment from SPE 532 and MED 
509 to MAT/534. The August 31, 2004 email to Plaintiff is the first communication 
to reflect the reallocation. Also, the reallocation is reflected in the invoice dated 
September 9, 2004. However, neither the email nor the invoice shows a late fee. 
Defendant's internal accounting record, titled Customer Account History, shows 
that the late fee was imposed on September 4, 2004. Plaintiff was not notified until 
the invoice dated October 13,2004. Since that invoice claims a balance owing from 
SPE 532 and MED 509, the late fee must relate to that balance. 
If the Customer Account History is accurate, the imposition of the late fee was 
concealed from Plaintiff in the September 9, 2004 invoice. Regardless, the records 
show that payment for SPE 532 and MED 509was not late due to any action or 
inaction of the Plaintiff. A balance was due for SPE 532 and MED 509 only because 
of the action of Defendant in reallocating payment. 
The imposition of a late fee violates Defendant's policy because the tuition was 
timely paid. The failure of Defendant to clearly and conspicuously represent that a 
late fee could be imposed following a reallocation of payment is an unfair and 
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deceptive act. 
C. The reallocation of payment from one debt to a disputed debt is and unfair and 
deceptive act or practice. 
Defendant has admitted to reallocating the payment she made for MAT 536 to 
SPE 532 and MED 509 after Plaintiff had disputed the charge for MAT 536. This is 
an unconscionable act under the UCSPA because Plaintiff had no choice where the 
debt would be applied and Plaintiff was never provided with notice that a 
reallocation could result in the imposition of a late fee. 
By way of analogy to other laws, both the terms "deceptive" and 
"unconscionable" are found in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The 
FDCPA expressly makes it per se unconscionable to: (a) falsely represent the 
character, amount, or legal status of the debt. If the debtor owes multiple debts, the 
collector may not apply a payment to a disputed debt, and must follow the debtor's 
instructions, if any, on allocation of payments to one particular debt instead of 
another. See 15 USC § 1692h. 
3. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated May 
12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the claim for violations of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1681, et. seq. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated May 12,2009 state 
that the Court determined that Defendant did not pay for all her classes and did owe 
$588 for tuition and a $30 late fee. 
-29-
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) establishes rules for furnishers of 
information upon receipt of disputes. In general, after receiving notice of a dispute, a 
provider of information must conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed 
information, review all of the relevant information provided by the consumer 
reporting agency, and report the results of the investigation to the agency. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681s-2. 
Plaintiff established that she wrote and telephone the University Collection 
Center after they placed a charge off on her account and reported it to the credit 
reporting agencies. Plaintiff verbally disputed the issue with University Collection 
Center manager Brett Dallas who refused to review the file, including two written 
letters disputing the debt. The failure to investigate and report is a violation of the 
FCRA. 
a. State law claims are not pre-empted. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated May 12, 2009 did 
not address the issue of pre-emption raised by Defendant in the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In brief, Plaintiffs state law claims were not pre-empted due to the lack 
of an actual conflict between state laws and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 
In addition, the FCRA expressly preserves state law causes of action. "Except as 
provided in subsections (b) and (c), this title does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt 
any person subject to the provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any 
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State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any information on 
consumers, or for the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent 
that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the 
extent of the inconsistency." 15 U.S.C. § 1681t. 
b. Plaintiff did establish evidence of a "Consumer Reporting Agency." 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated May 12, 2009 did 
not address the issue raised by Defendant in the Motion for Summary Judgment that 
Plaintiff did not establishing that Defendant was a provider of consumer reporting 
information. In brief, Plaintiff provided documentation, including the Equifax and 
Experian reports, confirming that Defendant was a provider of information, was 
contacted and confirmed the information reported. 
4. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated May 
12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the claim for the state tort violations. 
The fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not specifically 
identified in the May 12, 2009 Order granting Summary Judgment. The Court 
simply determined that Defendant owed $588 for tuition, $30 for a late fee, and $60 
for the e-resource fee, and thus did nothing wrong in trying to collect that amount. 
If the Court of Appeal upholds this determination, it will also determine that 
two of the initial communications to Plaintiff regarding the debt were 
misrepresentations: the invoice dated August 9,2004 showing a balance due of $750, 
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and the invoice dated August 27, 2004 showing no balance due for MAT/536. 
If the Court of Appeal upholds this determination, it is a finding that Plaintiff 
owed for MAT/536, the only course at issue with a tuition fee of $588. Thus, 
upholding the determination also results in a determination that two invoices sent to 
Plaintiff assessing charges for SPE/532 and MED/509, dated September 9,2004 and 
October 13, 2004, are misrepresentations of amounts owed. Also, it means that the 
August 31, 2004 email to Plaintiff is a misrepresentation that a balance is due for 
SPE/532 and MED/509. 
The late fee was imposed September 4, 2004. It is not reflected in the invoice 
dated September 9, 2004. This is a misrepresentation of an amount owed by 
omission. 
The trial court's found the late fee appropriate because of unpaid tuition for 
MAT/535. Since the late fee was imposed for a balance due on SPE/532 and 
MED/509, the failure to properly attribute the source of this late fee in any 
communication constitutes a misrepresentation. Thus, the trial court's determination 
means the October 13, 2004 and November 8, 2004 invoices assessing the late fee 
related to SPE/532 and MED/509 are misrepresentations. 
All of the demands for payment that included a late fee and all of the reporting by 
Defendant following the assessment of the late fee on September 4, 2004 are false 
misrepresentations because the payment of the tuition for SPE/532 and MED/509 
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was not owed. The tuition for each course was $498, or $996 combined, not $588 as 
the court found was due. 
Thus, the accounting used by Defendant to establish the crediting of the amounts 
debited to her account, Exhibit 10 to her deposition, establish that false information 
was communicated to debt collectors and to Experian and Equifax. 
Even if the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's Order, the numerous 
misrepresentations that Order establishes were clearly misleading. After creating 
unjustified confusion, Defendant sent Plaintiffs account to two different collection 
agencies and unilaterally withdrew Plaintiff from the school. False negative 
information was reported to Equifax and Experian resulting in the denial of a loan. 
Defendant's conduct was outrageous and intolerable because it was all caused by its 
misrepresentation that it would fully charge the amount owed for tuition on 
Plaintiffs credit card. 
Defendant's tortuous conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 
distress. She spend numerous hours trying to figure out how she could possibly owe 
money on courses she had been told would be charged in full to her credit card. She 
spent numerous hours contesting the misrepresentations relating to the invoices. All 
of this caused stress, back pain, weight gain, and sleep loss. It cause financial strain 
and a loan denial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests that the 
Utah Court of Appea reverse the District Court's Order dated May 12, 2009, 
granting Summary Judgment. 
>th RESPECTFULLY submitted this 18m dayM February, 2010. 
fA2-
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